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COMMENTS
PROTECTION OF RECREATION AND
SCENIC BEAUTY UNDER THE
WASHINGTON FOREST PRACTICES ACT
State regulation of forest practices' is a complex issue because of
the competition between growing demands for outdoor recreation and
environmental protection on the one hand, and for forest products on
the other. The conflict is exacerbated by the marginal economic status
of many forest operations. The history of forest practices regulation in
Washington reflects the tension between protecting aesthetic and rec-
reational forest uses and preserving the forest products industry. The
Washington Forest Practices Act of 19742 represents a compromise
between environmental and timber production concerns, but the com-
promise has not been implemented. Although regulations promul-
gated under the Act have provided some protection for fish, wildlife,
and water quality,3 these regulations do not address recreation or sce-
1. WASH. REV. CODE tit. 76 (1976 & Supp. 1977) (§ 76.09.020(8) defines the
term "forest practices").
2. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 76.09 (1976). Other states passed or revised forest prac-
tices acts during the same period. California enacted a new forest practices act after
its old act was invalidated on constitutional grounds in Bayside Timber Co. v. Board
of Supervisors, 20 Cal. App. 3d 1, 97 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1971). See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§§ 4511-4628 (West Supp. 1977); Comment, Regulation of Private Logging in Cali-fornia, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 139 (1975). Idaho and Oregon also enacted forest practices
acts during the early 1970's. See IDAHO CODE §§ 38-130f to -1312 (1977); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 527.610-.730 (1975). Nevada extensively amended its act during this period.
See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 528.010-.090 (1973).
3. WASH. ADMIN. CODE ch. 222 (1976), promulgated pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE
§ 76.09.040 and ch. 34.04 (1976). These regulations were filed with the Code Reviser
on June 16, 1976, but have not appeared in the bound code. They are available from
the Washington Forest Practices Board, Olympia, Washington. Examination of the
effect of these forest practices regulations on elements of the environment other than
recreation and scenic beauty is beyond the scope of this comment. However, the
forest practices regulations do address protection of fish, water quality, and wildlife.
For a variety of views on the protection afforded, see the Comments to WASHINGTON
FOREST PRACTICES BOARD, DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, & WASHINGTON DE-
PARTMENT OF ECOLOGY, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR PROPOSED
FOREST PRACTICES REGULATIONS (1976) (Comments incorporated as Final EIS) [here-
inafter cited as DRAFT EIS]. As to the impact of forest practices on water quality, fish,
soils, and wildlife, see, e.g., MANAGEMENT AND RESEARCH DIVISION, WASHINGTON DE-
PARTMENT OF FISHERIES, A REPORT ON SILTATION IN STEQUALEHO CREEK (1971);
OREGON STATE GAME COMMISSION, GUIDELINES FOR STREAM PROTECTION IN LOGGING
OPERATIONS (1971).
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nic beauty. 4 More important, the Act to a large extent preempts other
laws which could protect these values. As a result, recreation and
scenic beauty are afforded little protection from poorly planned and
executed forest practices.
This comment examines Washington's failure to adequately protect
recreation and scenic beauty from the adverse effects of forest prac-
tices. It first describes the Forest Practices Act, then discusses the ab-
sence of Forest Practices Board regulations protecting scenic beauty
and recreation. It then analyzes the preemptive effect of the Forest
Practices Act and its interrelationship with other laws and regulations
such as the State Environmental Protection Act (SEPA) and SEPA
guidelines, 5 the Shoreline Management Act, 6 and local regulations.
The comment concludes that further administrative and legislative ac-
tion is necessary to protect recreation and scenic beauty in Washing-
ton's forests.
I. WASHINGTON FOREST PRACTICES LEGISLATION
A. History of Forest Practices Legislation in Washington
Washington's first forest practices act, enacted in 1945, required
4. See Part II-A infra.
The particular effects on the environment of clearcutting and other techniques
which result in "even-age" tree stands are discussed in N. WOOD, CLEARCUT: THE DE-
FORESTATION OF AMERICA (1971). See Comment, Trees, Earth, Water and Ecological
Upheaval: Logging Practices and Watershed Protection in California, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 1117 (1966); Comment, Clearcutting: Can You See the Forest for the Trees?,
5 ENV. L. 85 (1974); Comment, Man's Activities in Watershed Areas-A Need for
Planning, 4 ENV. L. 229, 238-46 (1974). See also SCHOOL OF FORESTRY, OREGON
STATE UNIVERSITY, EVEN-AGE MANAGEMENT (proceedings of a Symposium held Aug.
1, 1972) (Hermann & Lavender eds. 1973); Evans, High Yield Forestry, SIERRA CLUB
BULL., Mar. 1972, at 10; Palmer, A Forest Practices Primer, FARTHEST CORNER, March-
April 1977, at 5 (the Washington Environmental Council newsletter).
A federal ruling that clearcutting on Forest Service lands violated the 1897 Forest
Service Organic Act, West Va. Div. of the Isaak Walton League v. Butz, 522 F.2d
945 (4th Cir. 1975), sparked a national debate over forest management practices on
public lands. This controversy led to the enactment of the National Forest Manage-
ment Act of 1976. Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§
1600-1614 (1976)), discussed in Pardo, Forestry Law and Policy, 7 U. TOL. L. REV.
999 (1976). See also Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1701-1782 (West Supp. 1977) (concerning federal lands administered by the Secre-
tary of the Interior through the Bureau of Land Management); Comment, Monon-
gahela and the National Forest Management Act of 1976, 7 ENV. L. 345 (1977);
Comment, National Forest Management Act of 1976-What Impact on Federal Tim-
ber Management, 13 IDAHO L. REV. 263 (1977).
5. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 43.21C (1976 & Supp. 1977); WASH. ADMIN. CODE ch.
197-10 (1976).
6. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.58 (1976 & Supp. 1977).
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forest landowners and logging operators to reforest logged lands as a
cost of doing business.7 Under this act, the constitutionality of com-
pelling the forest industry to protect forest resources was established.8
The primary purpose of this act, however, was to ensure continuous
production of timber, not to protect the environment.9 The 1945 act
did not address environmental values affected by forest practices,
such as fisheries, wildlife, water quality, recreation, and scenic
beauty.
During the following years, the public's burgeoning interest in rec-
reation and the environment had to compete with the demands of an
expanding forest industry.' 0  Environmental protection effected
7. Act of Mar. 15, 1945, ch. 193, 1945 Wash. Laws 556 (repealed 1974). The Act
was based on the Oregon Forest Conservation Act of 1941, ch. 237, 1941 Or. Laws
371 (current version at OR. REV. STAT. §§ 527.610-.730 (1975)). The connection
between Washington's law and the Oregon statute is described in Stacer, The Oregon
Forest Conservation Act, 2 WILLAMETTE L. J. 268, 282 (1962). Enforcement pro-
visions and sanctions under the 1945 Washington act are found at Act of Feb. 23,
1953, ch. 44, § 3, 1953 Wash. Laws 60 (repealed 1974).
Prior to 1945, logged land was converted to other uses or left to escheat to county
governments for nonpayment of taxes. See State v. Dexter, 32 Wn. 2d 551, 555-56,
202 P.2d 906, 908, afTfd, 338 U.S. 863 (1949). In the 1920's the state was sufficiently
concerned about deforestation and soil erosion to enact a provision whereby lands
which had escheated to the counties could be deeded to the state for reforestation at
state expense. Act of Mar. 21, 1927, ch. 288, § 3-b, 1927 Wash. Laws 704 (current
version at WASH. REV. CODE § 76.12.030 (1976)). The now abolished State Forest
Board had general power over state forest lands acquired for reforestation from coun-
ties and other sources. The functions of the State Forest Board and the Division of
Forestry of the now abolished Department of Conservation and Development (which
administered the 1945 Forest Practices Act) have been consolidated in the Department
of Natural Resources. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.30.010 (1976).
8. State v. Dexter, 32 Wn. 2d 551, 202 P.2d 906, affd, 338 U.S. 863 (1949).
9. Section 1 of the act enunciated the statutory policy of keeping the forest land
of this state continuously and fully productive by means of "continuous growth of
timber on all lands suitable for such purposes." Act of Mar. 15, 1945, ch. 193, § 1,
1945 Wash. Laws 556 (repealed 1974). Although the act required reforestation, it did
not ensure that reforestation would be as rapid as the removal of trees. For example,
there was no inducement to forest landowners to keep land in production and to
ensure future supplies of timber. It was not until the National Forest Management
Act of 1976 that any legislative body clearly directed that the even flow approach to
the sustained yield management concept be followed on national forest lands. 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1600-1614 (1976).
Under the 19.45 law, permittees were not required to restock the land or otherwise
ensure future growth if they were removing diseased or dying trees or clearing the
land for other "bona fide" purposes. Act of Mar. 15, 1945, ch. 193, § 9, 1945 Wash.
Laws 556 (repealed 1974). See also Oregon Forest Conservation Act of 1941, ch.
237, § 8, 1941 Or. Laws 371 (repealed 1971). However, Washington has encouraged
reforestation over the years through favorable tax policies for property undergoing
regeneration. See State ex rel. Mason County Logging Co. v. Wiley, 177 Wash. 65,
31 P.2d 539 (1934); WASH. REV. CODE chs. 84.28, 84.33, 84.34 (1976 & Supp. 1977).
For a discussion of the need for reforestation, see note 34 infra.
10. Increasing recreational demands are a product of increased population com-
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through local controls and piecemeal state programs"1 was supple-
mented in 1971 by legislative enactment of SEPA12 and the Shoreline
Management Act.' 3 Despite their increasing concern over environ-
mental degradation caused by some forest practices, environmental
groups were not the primary impetus behind the adoption of a new
Forest Practices Act in 1974.14 The legislation was introduced by the
bined with increased environmental awareness.
Increased population, and especially increased population density in the urban
areas, coupled with escalating public interest in outdoor recreation and the aesthe-
tic and natural qualities of open space, have resulted in a dramatic increase in
the use of all forms of outdoor recreational facilities. Between 1960 and 1975,
attendance at State parks alone increased over 320 percent, while the State
population increased by only 23 percent during the same period.
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, STATE OF WASHINGTON, STATE POLICIES FOR LAND USE AND
NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 25 (1977). Estimates indicate a three-fold increase
above 1973 levels by the year 2020 in use of the Alpine Lakes Wilderness Area in
the Cascade mountains. U.S. FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, REPORT
ON THE PROPOSED ALPINE LAKES WILDERNESS, WASHINGTON 10 (1975).
The degree of environmental concern in Washington is reflected in the results of
the Alternatives for Washington program. 1 WASHINGTON STATE OFFICE OF PROGRAM
PLANNING AND FISCAL MANAGEMENT, ALTERNATIVES FOR WASHINGTON 3, 13-14, 22
(1976); 9 id. at 10.
11. County land use planning and zoning have been attempted with regard to
forest practices. Under the Washington Planning Enabling Act, WASH. REV. CODE ch.
36.70 (1976 & Supp. 1977), a county's comprehensive plan should designate the pro-
posed distribution, location, and extent of land set aside for agricultural, industrial,
recreational, and other categories of public and private land use. Id. § 36.70.320-.330
(1976). The comprehensive plan may include a "conservation element" and a "recrea-
tion element." Id. § 36.70.350(1)-(2). Specific regulations may be adopted by county
ordinance to carry out the comprehensive plan. Id. §§ 36.70.550-.570. County plan-
ning authority under R.C.W. ch. 36.70 is now restricted with regard to forest practices
by the Washington Forest Practices Act. See Part II-D infra.
Although state and county parks satisfy some recreational, scenic, and other en-
vironmental needs, costs of acquisition and maintenance are significant restraints. One
state program which affected the conduct of forest practices was the Hydraulics Act.
enacted in 1955 as a section of the Fisheries Code to protect fish from timber
harvesting and other activities in the near streams. Food Fish and Shellfish-Fisheries
Code, ch. 12, § 75.20.100, 1955 Wash. Laws 22 (current version at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 75.20.100 (1976)). See note 98 infra. Evidence pointed to a connection between log-
ging and declining fish runs. See authorities cited at notes 3 & 4 supra. Authority
under the Act was limited, however, and the Washington State Departments of Fish-
eries and Game were not able to police all violations which occurred.
12. State Environmental Policy Act of 1971, ch. 109, 1971 Wash. Laws 1st Ex.
Sess. 623 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 43.21C (1976 & Supp. 1977)).
13. Shoreline Management Act of 1971, ch. 286, 1971 Wash. Laws Ist Ex. Sess.
1496 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.58 (1976 & Supp. 1977)). At least one
county has attempted to use its powers under the Shoreline Management Act to con-
trol logging practices and road construction in shoreline areas. Weyerhaeuser v. King
County, No. 52179 (Wash. Super. Ct., Thurston County, Feb. 7, 1977), review
granted, Washington Supreme Court, No. 44770, Mar. 3, 1977 (appeal from decision
of the Shorelines Hearings Board, SBH No. 155, March 10, 1975, reprinted in 2
WASH. STATE ENVIR. REP. (BPC) No. 155). See Layton, Cooking on All Burners: The
Forest Practices Act, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, May 29, 1975, § A, at 4, col. I.
14. Ch. 137, 1974 Wash. Laws Ist Ex. Sess. 401.
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forest industry in reaction to environmental legislation. 15 As enacted,
however, the language of the Act reflects a compromise between com-
peting demands on the forest resource.' 6
The Act created a Forest Practices Board (FPB) to promulgate reg-
ulations to implement the Act's purposes and policies.' 7 Promulgation
of such regulations was a difficult and time-consuming task because
15. D. Syrdal & J. Keegan, The Washington Forest Practices Act of 1974, Part I,
at 3-4 (May 21, 1975) (unpublished manuscript in Univ. of Washington Law School
Library) [hereinafter cited as Syrdal & Keegan]. See Brewer, Our Environment and
the Economics of the Forest, 33 FED. BAR J. 126 (1974); Miskovsky & Van Hook,
Regulation of Forestry Related Nonpoint Source Pollution Under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 9 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 645 (1976)
statement by Theodore R. Rogowski, Regional Counsel for Region X of the EPA,
before the Washington State House of Representatives, Nat. Resources Committee,
Olympia, Wash., June 1, 1973) (on file with the Washington Law Review). See generally
Comment, The National Forest Service and the Forest and Rangeland Renewable
Resources Planning Act of 1974, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 603, 611 (1975).
The State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA), WASH. REV. CODE ch. 43.21C
(1976 & Supp. 1977), also had potential application to state forest practices. Timber
sales and harvesting on federal lands had been held to be subject to the National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321-4361 (West 1977), on which
SEPA is based. See, e.g., Forest Resources Commission of ABA Nat. Resources Law
Section, Annual Review of Significant Legislative, Administrative and Judicial Activities
During 1974, 8 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 103, 103-05 (1975). The permit process under
the Washington Forest Practices Act of 1945, however, provided insufficient informa-
tion regarding environmental impacts of forest practices to enable the Department
of Natural Resources to comply with SEPA. See Syrdal & Keegan, supra at Part I n. 11.
16. This compromise is reflected in § I of the 1974 Act, R.C.W. § 76.09.010,
which states: "coincident with maintenance of a viable forest products industry, it is
important to afford protection to forest soils, fisheries, wildlife, water quantity and
quality, air quality, recreation and scenic beauty." As originally introduced, the forest
practices legislation seemed designed to protect the forest industry from those envir-
onmental laws which could have impeded harvesting. Wash. H.B. 637, 43d Legis. (1973),
required only that notification be sent to the Department of Natural Resources before
commencement of forest practices, and even this requirement could be dispensed
with if the regulations so provided. Id. § 4, (1). Under this proposal, the Depart-
ment of Natural Resources did not have to approve the proposed operation or issue
a permit; therefore SEPA would not have applied. The bill largely eliminated the
authority of the Departments of Fisheries and Game under the Hydraulics Act,
WASH. REV. CODE § 75.20.100 (1976), discussed at Part 11-C infra. Wash. H.B. 637,
§ 18, 43d Legis. (1973). Section 10 of H.B. 637 limited regulation of forest practices
by local government under land use and zoning powers, but Shoreline Management
Act authority was expressly preserved for local governments. Wash. H.B. 637, § 10(d),
43d Legis. (1973).
This bill did not pass in 1973 because conflicts between the affected industry,
county governments, environmental groups, and the Department of Natural Resources
necessitated nine redrafts of the legislation. See Syrdal & Keegan, supra note 15, at 4-10.
Ultimately, county governments won limited recognition for land use planning and
zoning authority. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 76.09.050(5)-(11), .060(3), .140(2), .180,
.240 (1976). The provisions of the Hydraulics Act were preserved. Id. § 76.09.910.
But see discussion of the Hydraulics Act at Part II-C infra. In addition, a permit
issuance system was adopted, making SEPA applicable in part. WASH. REV. CODE §
76.09.050(1)(d) (1976). See discussion of SEPA at Part II-B infra.
17. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 76.09.010, .030, .040 (1976).
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of the divergent views of Board members and the lack of substantive
guidance in the Act.' 8 Before final regulations were issued, organized
opposition from timberland owners and contract loggers resulted in
substantial amendments to the law. 19 These 1975 amendments largely
eliminated the possibility of environmental protection from sources
other than regulations under the Forest Practices Act.20
B. General Provisions of the Forest Practices Act
The Forest Practices Act applies to forest practices on all non-
federal forest land in Washington 2 '-approximately 11,168,000
acres. 22 Federal forest lands are managed independently under federal
laws.2 3 Regulations issued by the FPB contain the substantive require-
18. Interview with Polly Dyer, original member of the FPB, in Seattle (Nov. 23,
1976). Interview with Dave Knibb, original member of the FPB, in Seattle (Jan. 10.
1977). A number of groups contributed advance work for the FPB. A "Forest
Practices Ad Hoc Committee" was appointed by the Commissioner of Public Lands
in July 1973 in anticipation of passage of the 1974 Act. DRAFT EIS, supra note 3, at
1-2. The Ad Hoc Committee's Field Guide to Washington Forest Practices was used
by the Forest Practices Advisory Committee in drawing up proposed regulations.
Washington State Department of Natural Resources, Field Guide to Washington
Forest Practices Guidelines for 1974 (on file with the Washington Law Review). The
Forest Practices Advisory Committee was established to aid the FPB in promulgating
regulations. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.200 (1976). Two committees, representing
western and eastern Washington, held statewide public hearings and presented pro-
posed regulations to the FPB, based largely on Forest Practices Ad Hoc Committee
drafts. The Advisory Committee was assisted by the Washington Forest Protection
Association, an industry trade organization which represents large forest products
firms. Syrdal & Keegan, supra note 15, at Part I n.17. See also DRAFT EIS. supra note
3, at 5-6 (outlining concurrent activities by the Department of Ecology pertaining to
forest practices regulation and water quality standards).
19. See Act of June 16, 1975, ch. 200, 1975 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 665. A
legislative history of industry opposition to the Act and subsequent amendments is
contained in B. Hansen, Protection of Recreation and Scenic Beauty under Washington's
Forest Practices Act 7-12 (June 1977) (unpublished manuscript in Univ. of Washing-
ton Law School Library).
20. See Part II infra.
21. State forest land is defined as "all land which is capable of supporting a mer-
chantable stand of timber and is not being actively used for a use which is incom-
patible with timber growing." WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.020(6) (1976).
22. Forest and alpine land accounts for 54.2% of the state's total 42,605,000
acres. Of this, 68.7%, or 11,168,000 acres, are state, county, municipal, or private
commercial forest lands, subject to the Forest Practices Act. DRAFT EIS, supra note 3,
at 56-57.
23. The 5,424,000 acres of the national forest system in Washington are admin-
istered under the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531
(1976); the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4361
(1977); and the National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1614
(1976). The National Forest Management Act requires development and implementa-
tion of land management plans for the National Forests, with criteria for the protec-
448
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ments for forest practices.24 The Act establishes four classes of forest
practices, based upon the impact that a proposed forest operation
may have on the environment. The assigned class determines the de-
gree of involvement by the Department of Natural Resources (DNR)
and other state agencies.
Class I activities include "[m] inimal or specific forest practices
that have no direct potential for damaging a public resource."25 Activ-
ities designated Class I may be conducted without notifying or apply-
ing to the DNR.26 Class II forest practices are those which have "less
than [an] ordinary potential for damaging a public resource. 27
These also do not require an application to or approval by the DNR.
Any person planning to engage in a Class II practice need only notify
the DNR in writing prior to commencing operations. Class III and
Class IV forest practices require an application and DNR approval.28
Class III is defined as any forest practice other than Class I, Class II,
or Class IV. Class IV includes any forest practice other than those
contained in Class I or Class II on lands which will become or which
are subject to local land use control under R.C.W. § 76.09.240 and
any forest practice which should be assessed for its environmental im-
tion and use of forest resources. The Act requires the U.S. Forest Service to coordinate
land management plans with state and local governments and other federal agencies.
The Washington State Board of Natural Resources has appointed a Forest and Range
Advisory Council to provide input into this planning process. See Washington State
Department of Natural Resources, State of Washington, A Forest and Range Program
for Washington State (Sept. 1, 1977) (on file with the Washington Law Review).
The federal act is reviewed in Pardo, Forestry Law and Policy, 7 U. TOL. L. REV.
999, 1005-12 (1976). See also Comment, Monongahela and the National Forest
Management Act of 1976, 7 ENv. L. 345 (1977); note 34 infra. Other federal lands
are administered by the Bureau of Land Management under the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1782 (West Supp. 1977).
24. WASH. ADMIN. CODE ch. 222-46 (1976).
25. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.050(l) (1976). Public resources include water,
fish, wildlife, and capital improvements of the state and local governments. Id. §
76.09.020(13).
26. The notification and approval requirements in R.C.W. § 76.09.050(2) apply
only to Class II, Class III, or Class IV practices.
27. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.050(1) (1976). This section further provides:
Class II shall not include forest practices:
(a) On lands platted after January 1, 1970, or being converted to another use;
(b) Which require approvals under the provisions of the hydraulics act, RCW
75.20. 100;
(c) Within "shorelines of the state" as defined in RCW 90.58.030; or
(d) Excluded from Class II by the board;
28." Id. § 76.09.050(2).
449
Washington Law Review
pact prior to approval. 29 Forest practices regulations determine the
classification of a given forest practice.3 0
The Forest Practices Act specifically requires reforestation of
logged areas.3' There is, however, no requirement that lands be kept
in production.3 2 Indeed, the FPB is given power to modify or elimi-
nate reforestation requirements on land identified as potentially con-
vertible to urban development, if such a classification is consistent
with local land use policies.33 In addition, there is no requirement that
the rate of cut on all lands be equal to or less than the rate of overall
tree growth. In the future, however, reforestation requirements may
become more stringent in light of a projected timber shortage.3 4 An-
other problem is the rapid eradication of old growth timber stands,
29. Class IV specifically includes those forest practices not included in Classes
I or II which take place:
(a) on lands platted after January 1. 1960, (b) on lands being converted to
another use, (c) on lands which, pursuant to RCW 76.09.070 . . . are not to be
reforested because of the likelihood of future conversion to urban development.
and/or (d) which have a potential for a substantial impact on the environment
and therefore require an evaluation by [DNR] as to whether or not a detailed
statement must be prepared pursuant to the state environmental policy act.
Id. § 76.09.050()(1976).
30. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-16-050 (1976).
31. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.070 (1976) and WASH. ADMIN. CODE ch.
222-34 (1976) with Act of Mar. 15, 1945, ch. 193, §§ 5, 6, 1945 Wash. Laws 556
(repealed 1974).
32. The reforestation requirement applies, under the statute and regulations,
whether or not removal of trees was pursuant to an application. If the removal
originally involved an application, however, additional duties are imposed. The appli-
cant is required to indicate whether the land will be taken out of commercial timber
production within three years after completion of the described forest practice. WASH.
REV. CODE § 76.09.060(3) (1976).
The reforestation requirement does not apply, however, if the land is converted to
a use other than commercial timber production within three years following the com-
pletion of harvest. Id. § 76.09.060(3)(a). See also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-34-050
(1976). Termination of forest practices will result in the loss of the favorable tax
treatment given timberlands under state law unless the conversion is to a use per-
mitted under a current use tax agreement pursuant to R.C.W. ch. 84.34. WASH. REV.
CODE § 76.09.060(3)(a)(ii) (1976). In such cases, local land use and zoning author-
ity is the only statutory means by which conversion to a use other than timber produc-
tion may be controlled. Id. § 76.09.060(3)(a)(iii).
33. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.070 (1976); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-34-050(2)
(1976).
34. If timber is to be removed at the same rate as it is to be replaced by new
growth, the two areas for regulation are the rate of harvest and the rate of new
growth. Compare the Washington Act, which does not attempt to supervise the rate
of removal, but only to ensure growth after removal, WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.070
(1976), with the sustained-yield approach of the National Forest Management Act
of 1976, which restricts the rate of harvest, 16 U.S.C.A. § 161 l(a) (West Supp. 1977).
The latter approach, and alternatives to it, are dicussed in Comment, Monogahela
and the National Forest Management Act of 1976, 7 ENv. L. 345 (1977). This comment
advocates a national removal and reforestation policy for forest lands. Such a policy
450
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particularly prized for their recreation opportunities and scenic
beauty. It is estimated that in fifteen years, all the old growth timber
(over 160 years old) on private and state trust lands will be gone.35
The Act does not specifically address the problem.
Administrative and enforcement powers under the Act are vested in
the DNR.36 Its primary administrative task involves reviewing the ap-
plications and notifications required of logging operations and forest
landowners prior to commencing operations. 37 Enforcement mecha-
nisms include inspections, 38 advisory supplemental directives, 39 stop
would help to resolve the conflict between the rising demand for timber and the
projected shortage of supply. U.S. FOREST SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE.
TWO PROJECTIONS OF TIMBER SUPPLY IN THE PACIFIC COAST STATES 8-13 (USDA For.
Serv. Resource Bull. PNW-60 (1975)); Congressional Research Service, Library of
Congress, The Douglas Fir Region Timber Supply Situation and Log Export Regula-
tion as Proposed by H.R. 5544 (May 1975). The Washington Department of Natural
Resources maintains a more optimistic position on timber supply. Department of
Natural Resources, State of Washington, Washington Forest Productivity Study: Phase
I Report (June 1975).
35. Andrews, Cle-acutting: Efficient Practice or Wasteful Blight?, The Seattle
Times, Oct. 9, 1977, § E, at 2, col. 1. See also authorities cited at note 34 supra.
36. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 76.09.020(5), .040(1) (1976). The FPB has also estab-
lished a policy for a continuing program of orientation and training to be conducted by
the DNR with relation to forest practices and their regulation under the Act. Id. §
76.09.250. The Department, along with other affected agencies and institutions, must
annually determine the state's needs for research in forest practices and the impact of
forest practices on "public resources," id. § 76.09.020(13), and recommend needed
projects to the Governor and the legislature, id. § 76.09.270.
37. Id. §§ 76.09.050-060 (1976). The classes of forest practices and the degree
of DNR review afforded are discussed at text accompanying notes 25-30 supra. The
statute sets forth the length of time for which notification or approval is effective,
WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.060(6) (1976), the number of forest practices which may
be covered by each application or notification, id. § 76.09.060(2), and when a prac-
tice is sufficiently different from an approved practice that a new application or
notification must be made, id. § 76.09.060(5).
In its discretion, the DNR may request notification from Class III and IV applicants
two days before commencement of actual operations if the forest practice has a poten-
tial for causing material damage to a public resource because of soil conditions, prox-
imity to water, or some other "unusual" factor. Id. § 76.09.060(4). This allows DNR
representatives to be on site during operations to assist in preventing damage. No
prior application or notification is required for emergency forest practices. Id. §
76.09.060(7); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-20-070 (1976).
38. The DNR is required to make any necessary inspections before, during, and
after forest practices are conducted, to ensure that no material damage occurs to the
natural resources of the state from such practices. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.150 (1976).
Representatives of the Department of Ecology may also inspect operations. Id. §
76.09.160.
39. Supplemental directives are issued to recommend "an alternate preferred
course of action or a minor change in the operation, which the Department believes
would provide greater assurance that the purposes and policies set forth in RCW
76.09.010 will be met." WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-12-060 (1976).
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work orders,40 and notices of failure to comply. 41 Enforcement ac-
tions and penalties are appealable to a special tribunal, the Forest
Practices Appeals Board.42 The speed and scope of an enforcement
action depends upon the gravity of the threat to "public resources."
The time allowed for compliance depends upon whether a stop work
order or notice of failure to comply is issued by the DNR.43 Viola-
tions of the Act or its regulations may subject operators to civil and
40. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.080 (1976). Stop work orders may be issued to
"operators" whether or not they are required to submit an application or notification.
An "operator" is defined as "any person engaging in forest practices except an em-
ployee with wages as his sole compensation." Id. § 76.09.020(11). The DNR may
serve the operator with a stop work order for violating the Act or regulations, for
deviating from an approved application, or when immediate action is necessary to
avoid material damage to a public resource. Id. § 76.09.080(1). The order is review-
able before the Forest Practices Appeals Board. Id. § 76.09.080(2)(d).
41. "If a violation, a deviation, material damage or potential for material dam-
age to a public resource has occurred and the department determines that a stop work
order is unnecessary, then the department shall issue and serve upon the operator" a
notice, which does not require immediate compliance. Id. § 76.09.090.
Stop work orders are, and notices of failure to comply become, final orders of the
Department. Id. § 76.09.080(1). Along with final decisions of the Forest Practices
Appeals Board, they are binding on all parties unless declared invalid on appeal. Id.
§ 76.09.110. The DNR is authorized to enforce such final orders and final decisions
through the Attorney General, and may enjoin forest practices by any person for one
year after such person has failed to comply with an order or decision. Id. § 76.09.140 (1).
See id. §§ 76.09.120, .170 (additional remedies available to the DNR).
42. The Forest Practices Appeals Board consists of three gubernatorial appointees
"qualified by experience and training in pertinent matters pertaining to the environ-
ment." WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.210(2) (1976). This Board has exclusive jurisdic-
tion to hear appeals from actions and determinations by the DNR. Id. § 76.09.220(8).
Any person aggrieved by DNR approval or disapproval of an application may seek
review by the Board. Id. § 76.09.220(9)(a). Standing before the Forest Practices
Appeals Board is thus broadly based, but only relates to forest practices for which an
application is required.
Proceedings are subject to the Washington Administrative Procedure Act's provisions
regarding contested cases. Id. § 76.09.220(9)(b); see Washington Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 34.04 (1976 & Supp. 1977). The party taking the
appeal may elect either a formal or an informal hearing, unless she already has had
an informal hearing with the Department. Id. § 76.09.230(1). Judicial review of Forest
Practices Appeals Board decisions is de novo unless the decision is rendered pursuant
to a formal hearing, in which event limited review may be had under the State Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, id. §§ 34.04.130, .140 (1976 & Supp. 1977). See id. §
76.09.230(5).
The Board has been relatively inactive, and Governor Ray has recently recommended
that the legislature review its status under the state's sunset law to determine whether
it can be abolished. Governor lists 21 targets for probes under new sunset law, The
SeattleTimes, Nov. 30, 1977, § D, at 2, col. 1.
43. The time allowed for exhaustion of the administrative review process. includ-
ing appeals, may cause significant enforcement problems under a notice of failure to
comply. Although such notices are final orders of the Department, direct appeal to
the Forest Practices Appeals Board is not allowed. WASH. REv. CODE § 76.09.090
(1976). The operator need not comply immediately if, within 15 days of service, he
requests the Department to schedule a hearing. The Department may schedule a hear-
ing as much as 20 days after receiving the request. After the hearing, the Department
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criminal penalties. 44 The DNR has a great deal of discretion in en-
forcement actions, 45 limited only by a general directive to carry out
the purposes and policies stated in the Act.46
II. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY PROTECTION
OF SCENIC BEAUTY AND RECREATION
IN WASHINGTON FORESTS
A. The Forest Practices Act and Related Regulations
In the Forest Practices Act, the legislature declared that "coinci-
has 10 days to issue its final order and the operator has an additional 30 days to
appeal the order to the Forest Practices Appeals Board. Id.
By allowing an operator to resist compliance for a maximum of 75 days before
appealing to the Board, this procedure fails to protect public resources from log-
ging abuse, without furthering any legitimate interest of the operator or owner, who
is afforded ample procedural protection through an administrative hearing before the
Board and subsequent judicial review. See id. § 76.09.230. The lengthy departmental
remedy actually harms the economic interests of owners and operators by delaying
implementation of timber harvest plans prior to review by the Forest Practices Appeals
Board. Although the DNR should have an opportunity to review and correct its own
actions, the determination of whether a violation, deviation, or material damage to a
public resource has occurred should not require more time than that allotted to deter-
mine whether an EIS is necessary or to approve a Class IV application. Compare id. §
76.09.090 with id. § 76.09.050.
By contrast, the stop work order requires immediate compliance. The operator or
owner of the land or timber may appeal the order directly to the Forest Practices
Appeals Board within 15 days and the Board may continue or discontinue the De-
partment's order in whole or in part, under such conditions as it may impose, pend-
ing the outcome of the hearing. Id. § 76.09.080(2)(d).
44. Those who violate the Act or regulations, including those who aid and abet
such violations, are subject to a civil penalty of $500 per violation. Id. § 76.09.170.
Each violation is a separate and distinct offense, as is each day's continuance of a
violation. Id. The 1975 amendments reduced the maximum penalties from $1,000 a day
to $500 a day and limited the penalty for continuance of a violation to stop work
orders or compliance notices. Act of June 16, 1975, ch. 200, § 9, 1975 Wash. Laws
1st Ex. Sess. 665 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.170 (1976)).
The Act also imposes a duty to prevent, correct, or compensate for damage to public
resources. WASH. REV. CODE 88 76.09.080(2)(c), .090(3) (1976). A statute of limi-
tations was added in 1975. Act of June 16, 1975, ch. 200, § 6, 1975 Wash. Laws 1st
Ex. Sess. 665 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE 76.09.090 (1976)). The Act permits the
DNR to remit or mitigate the penalty, allows appeal to the Forest Practices Appeals
Board, WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.170 (1976), and provides a criminal penalty for
violations of the Act or regulations. Id. § 76.09.190 (gross misdemeanor).
Upon failure of the DNR to act, the county may sue to enforce final orders or
forest practices regulations; however, no penalties may be imposed for conduct pur-
suant to an approval or directive of the Department. Id. § 76.09.140.
45. The DNR determines the existence of a violation and decides whether a viola-
tion is to be swiftly remedied by a stop work order or left to the protracted notice of
failure to comply procedure. The DNR may remit or mitigate any civil penalty it
imposes. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.170 (1976). The Attorney General is not required
to pursue collection of civil penalties unless the DNR requests it. Id.
46. Id. § 76.09.040(1).
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dent with maintenance of a viable forest products industry, it is im-
portant to afford protection to forest soils, fisheries, wildlife, water
quantity and quality, air quality, recreation, and scenic beauty."47
The drafters apparently contemplated that any conflicts between the
Act's competing goals would be minimized by balanced regulations
from the FPB.48 However, the hoped-for regulations have not been
forthcoming. No forest practices regulations protect scenic beauty,
and recreation is aided only by regulations preventing the contamina-
tion of water supplies at improved campsites. 49
The lack of regulatory protection is partially attributable to a mem-
orandum written by an assistant state attorney general in 1974, stat-
ing that the FPB lacks power to issue regulations protecting
aesthetics. 50 Although R.C.W. § 76.09.010(1) provides for protection
of both scenic beauty and recreation, and although the FPB is di-
rected to promulgate regulations effectuating R.C.W. § 76.09.010, 51
protection of recreation and scenic beauty is not included among the
stated goals of the "comprehensive" system of regulations envisioned
under R.C.W. § 76.09.010(2).52 This legislative omission was used to
47. Id. § 76.09.010(1).
48. The Act itself states that forest practices regulations "shall be promulgated
and administered so as to give consideration to all purposes and policies set forth in
RCW 76.09.0 10." Id. § 76.09.040(1).
49. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 222-16-030(2), -24-010 to -060, -30-010 to -100,
-34-010 to -050, -38-010 to -020 (1976). But see id. §§ 222-16-010(8), -020. The
regulations classify streams for pollution compliance purposes and fisheries protection,
ostensibly considering public recreation, but many small streams having high recrea-
tional and aesthetic values are classified so that restrictions on adjacent forest practices
are minimal. Id. §§ 222-16-010(8),-020.
50. Interoffice Correspondence from Robert Sailer, Ass't Attorney General, to
Bert Cole, FPB Chairman, Concerning a Legal Issue Raised by the Forest Practices
Board (August 20, 1974) (on file with the Washington Law Review) [hereinafter
cited as Sailer memo]. The Chairman's question was: "Can the Board promulgate
regulations requiring buffers, methods of logging, etc., based on scenic beauty and
aesthetic considerations?" Id. at 1.
51. WASH. REv. CODE § 76.09.040(1) (1976).
52. R.C.W. § 76.09.010(2) provides: "The legislature further finds and declares
it to be in the public interest of this state to create and maintain through the adoption
of this chapter a comprehensive state-wide system of laws and forest practices regula-
tions which will achieve the following purposes and policies." The statute then lists a
number of objectives that the regulations are to accomplish, but does not mention pro-
tection of air quality, scenic beauty, or recreation. Although one objective stated in
R.C.W. § 76.09.010(2)(b) is to "[a]fford protection to forest soils and public re-
sources," the definition of public resources does not include recreation and scenic
beauty. See notes 25 & 36 supra.
According to the Sailer memo, the first paragraph of R.C.W. § 76.09.010
stated the breath [sic] of [legislative] concern regarding state policy, the im-
portance of forests to the economy of the state, and the need for protection of
many elements in the environment. The legislature did not establish a standard
454
Vol. 53: 443, 1978
Forest Practices Regulation
support the interpretation that the FPB lacks authority to protect aes-
thetics and, by implication, recreation.53 The assistant attorney gen-
eral's memorandum contends that R.C.W. § 76.09.010(1), which
refers to scenic beauty and recreation, is a mere "preamble" contain-
ing "passive words of concern" which cannot be used as a basis for
regulations.5 4 The opinion contrasts the language of subsection (1)
with the words used in subsection (2), and characterizes the latter as
or a directive upon which a court could enforce a right or upon which an imple-
menting agency ... could promulgate a regulation.
Sailer memo, supra note 50, at 3. The opinion stated, however, that these "words of
concern" should be given "strong consideration in the promulgation of rules to effect
the main objective of the Forest Practices Act, namely the regulation of activities
related to harvesting and reforestation of timber." Id. at 3.
53. Sailer memo, supra note 50. The opinion discusses only the power of the
Board to protect aesthetics.
During consideration of amendments to the Forest Practices Act in 1975, a major
effort was made to change R.C.W. § 76.09.010(1) to conform explicitly to the Sailer
interpretation. A proposed bill would have changed the Act's language to the follow-
ing: "It is important to afford protection to forest soils, fisheries, wildlife, water
quantity and quality, and air quality. Benefiting the above activities and resources
will generally enhance recreational opportunities and scenic beauty." Wash. S.B. 2954,
§ 1, 44th Legis. (1975). This amendment passed the Senate but was rejected by the
joint conference committee. See 1975 House Journal 1175-86 (amending Wash. S.B.
2954, § 1, 44th Legis.); B. Hansen, supra note 19, at 8-12.
54. Sailer memo, supra note 50, at 3, 6. The memo also applied the "no part of
the act" rule of construction which holds that "[t] he preamble can neither restrain or
[sic] extend a meaning of an ambiguous statute; nor can it be used to create doubt
or uncertainty." Id. at 6 (citing Robinson v. Difford, 92 F. Supp. 145 (E.D. Pa. (1950)).
As authority, the opinion cited 2A C.D. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 47.04 (4th ed. 1973). This treatise proceeds to note, however, that "[i] f the pre-
amble is more extensive or more restrictive than the purview [body] and the whole
act method of interpretation is used, then the statute is not unambiguous, and its
true meaning must be interpreted from all its parts." Id. § 47.04, at 78. This statement
should apply to the Forest Practices Act because Washington uses the "whole act"
method of interpretation. See Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., 82
Wn. 2d 475, 489-90, 513 P.2d 36, 46 (1973).
Indeed, no part of R.C.W. § 76.09.010(1) is strictly a preamble, because all of the
statements follow the enacting clause in the statute. See C.D. SANDS, supra at § 47.04.
The justification for the "no part of the act" rule of interpretation for policy sections
is derived from the technical definition of preambles (i.e., because the preamble pre-
ceded the enacting clause, the preamble was not enacted and could be given no legal
effect). Id. When these same preamble phrases are placed after the enacting clause, in
the purpose or policy section of the act, courts construe them as preambles when
appropriate. See, e.g., Huntworth v. Tanner, 87 Wash. 670, 152 P. 523 (1915); 41
CORNELL L.Q. 134 (1955).
Even if R.C.W § 76.09.010(1) is construed as a preamble, it may still be given
effect. Washington generally disregards the "no part of the act" rule of interpretation
and gives effect to preambles unless doing so retracts authority granted by the pur-
view, or remainder, of the statute. Washington treats preambles or policy statements
as touchstones or keys to the statute, as guides to legislative intent, and also as the basis
for implying legally enforceable rights. See Leschi Improvement Council v. State High-
way Comm'n, 84 Wn. 2d 271, 525 P.2d 774 (1974) (statement in the policy section
of the State Environmental Policy Act, R.C.W. § 43.21C.020(3), conferred standing
upon persons potentially affected by noise and fumes of a proposed highway); cases
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"action-forcing . . . policy directives."5 5 The assistant attorney gen-
eral's position is bolstered by the Act's requirement that the FPB pro-
mulgate regulations "to accomplish the purposes and policies stated in
R.C.W. § 76.09.010"56 because subsection (2) is the only part of that
section expressly referring to the content of the regulations, or to pur-
poses and policies.57
cited at note 61 infra. Accord, Wisconsin's Environmental Decade v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 69 Wis. 2d 1, 230 N.W.2d 243 (1975). But see International Union of Op-
erating Engineers Local 286 v. Sand Point Country Club, 83 Wn. 2d 498, 519 P.2d
985 (1974) (dictum); State ex rel. Berry v. Superior Court, 92 Wash. 16, 159 P. 92
(1916) (a preamble "is without force," "a guide to intentions" which "can never en-
large"). The preamble or policy section of a statute will not control the purview if
its effect is to forbid agency action which the purview would allow. Shell Oil Co. v.
Brooks, 88 Wn. 2d 909, 912, 567 P.2d 1132, 1134 (1977); In re Bale, 63 Wn. 2d 83.
87, 385 P.2d 545, 547 (1963); Huntworth v. Tanner, 87 Wash. 670, 677, 152 P. 523.
526(1915).
If the first paragraph of R.C.W. § 76.09.010 is a preamble, then the entire section
is a preamble because it is syntactically similar throughout. In R.C.W. § 76.09.010(1),
the legislature "finds and declares" certain concerns to be "among the most valuable,"
"of prime importance," "in the public interest," and "important." In the second para-
graph, "the legislature further finds and declares . . . a comprehensive state-wide
system of laws and forest practices regulations which will achieve [certain] purposes
and policies" to be "in the public interest." The entire section constitutes a series of
findings of fact and declarations of purpose. It is highly unlikely that this policy sec-
tion forms "no part of the act" in light of the directive to the FPB in R.C.W. §
76.09.040(l) to promulgate regulations to carry out the purposes and policies stated
in R.C.W. § 76.09.010.
55. Sailer memo, supra note 50, at 3, 4. This distinction is questionable because
the two subsections contain identical language and emphasis to "afford protection to"
enumerated elements of concern. Even if the standards in subsection (1) are less
specific than those in subsection (2), promulgation of regulations under subsection
(i) would probably withstand constitutional challenge under Washington's liberal
delegation of powers test. See, e.g., Barry & Barry, Inc. v. Department of Motor
Vehicles, 81 Wn. 2d 155, 500 P.2d 540, appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 977 (1972).
The legislature recognized that detailed administrative expertise was necessary for
forest practices regulations and set up an elaborate promulgation process. WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 76.09.040, .200 (1976). Because the forest practices regulations must be
adopted pursuant to the elaborate provisions in the Act, and pursuant to the pro-
visions in the Washington Administrative Procedure Act, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 34.04
(1976), the delegation of power to the FPB to carry out the policies of both subsec-
tions of R.C.W. § 76.09.010 is constitutional. Caffal Bros. v. State, 79 Wn. 2d 223,
484 P.2d 912 (1971). Cf. Bayside Timber Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 20 Cal. App.
3d 1, 97 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1971) (a different legislative scheme was invalidated).
56. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.040(1) (1976).
57. Arguably, legislative purposes and policies are expressed in R.C.W. §
76.09.010(1) as well as in R.C.W. § 76.09.010(2). Absent some indication that the
legislature intended statutory words to be used in a special, legal sense, their common
meaning determines the sense in which they are used. John H. Sellen Constr. Co. v.
Department of Revenue, 87 Wn. 2d 878, 558 P.2d 1342 (1976); Garrison v. State
Nursing Bd., 87 Wn. 2d 195, 550 P.2d 7 (1976).
The Sailer analysis would be acceptable if the legislature anticipated that recreation
and scenic beauty would be protected under other laws, or protected incidentally
under forest practices regulations. The latter approach has not been followed. See note
49 supra. Protection of recreation and scenic beauty under other laws is contrary to
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Principles of statutory construction applied in cases construing the
state Shoreline Management Act58 support a contrary position.5 9 In
these cases, courts have treated references to the "policy" of the Act
contained in its policy statement 60 to encompass all statements of pol-
icy, even though they are phrased as legislative findings. The courts
have looked to the whole of the preamble or policy section to deter-
mine the policy of the statute.61 Although scenic beauty and recrea-
tion are not included in the definition of "public resources" under the
Forest Practices Act, 62 legislative history indicates that these values
were to be protected.63 Nevertheless, the Act as currently interpreted
the thrust of the Forest Practices Act, which centralizes regulation of forest practices
in the DNR and bodies set up in the Act.
58. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.58 (1976 & Supp. 1977).
59. Hayes v. Yount, 87 Wn. 2d 280, 552 P.2d 1038 (1976); Department of
Ecology v. Ballard Elks Lodge, 84 Wn. 2d 551, 527 P.2d 1121 (1974).
60. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020 (1976).
61. Although the first paragraph of R.C.W § 90.58.020 is couched in terms of "find-
ings," and the following three paragraphs are phrased as explicit statements of policy,
the Washington Supreme Court has relied upon statements in the first paragraph as
the policy of the Act in upholding actions of the Shorelines Hearing Board. Hayes v.
Yount, 87 Wn. 2d 280, 291-92, 552 P.2d 1038, 1045 (1976); Department of Ecology
v. Ballard Elks Lodge, 84 Wn. 2d 551, 556-57, 527 P.2d 1121, 1124-25 (1974).
62. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.020(13) (1976).
63. The legislature may have wanted the FPB to protect recreation and scenic
beauty, but not to have these values treated as public resources, and consequently did
not include them in R.C.W. § 76.09.010(2)(b). See note 52 supra. The term "public
resource" has great significance in the Forest Practices Act. It constitutes a direction
to the Forest Practices Board on how to classify forest practices, and this classification
in turn determines the amount of agency involvement in forest operations. See WASH.
REV. CODE § 76.09.050 (1976); notes 25-30 and accompanying text supra. The liability
of operators, timber owners, and forest landowners depends upon the definition of
public resources. See WASH. REv. CODE §§ 76.09.080, .090 (1976).
While special logging techniques may minimize damage to water quality and fish,
damage to recreation and scenic beauty is often a natural result of the simple removal
of the forest. See generally Region X, United States Environmental Protection Agency,
Forest Harvest, Residue Treatment, Reforestation and. Protection of Water Quality
(April 1976). Inclusion of recreation and scenic beauty as public resources could
have drastically increased the constraints on when, where, and how to log, particu-
larly in highly scenic, old growth stands. Old growth forests form the largest per-
centage of the volume of timber harvested by large industrial firms. WASHINGTON STATE
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 1975 TIMBER HARVEST REPORT, Table XV, at
30 ('"Total Private Timber Harvested, Washington, Summary, 1975").
The legislature could have eradicated the Sailer interpretation by simply including
recreation and scenic beauty in R.C.W. § 76.09.010(2)(b), along with forest soils and
public resources, without including recreation and scenic beauty in the definition of
public resources. Given the political climate in 1975, the absence of such a change
is understandable. See B. Hansen, supra note 19, at 7-12.
As originally introduced, the bill did not refer to protection of air quality, recreation,
or scenic beauty. Wash. H.B. 637, § l(1), 43d Legis. (1973) (first draft). Subpara-
graph (2)(b) of section I stated that the regulations must afford protection to forest
soils and public resources. Public resources were defined as "public air, fisheries,
wildlife and waters." Id. § 2(11). The Departments of Natural Resources and Ecology'
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provides no meaningful protection for recreation and scenic beauty.
The lack of protection for these values under other laws makes the
need for such protection more acute.
B. The State Environmental Policy Act
The State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA)64 requires state agen-
cies and local governments to consider environmental values (includ-
ing recreation and scenic beauty) in planning and decisionmaking,
and to consider environmental consequences before acting. 65 There-
fore, SEPA could be read to require that the DNR consider environ-
(later changed to the FPB) were given power to effectuate only the purposes and
policies stated in paragraph 2 of section 1. Id. § 3(1).
Because of criticism from state agencies, counties, and environmental groups, a
third draft was circulated at the July 23, 1973, House Forest Practices Subcommittee
meeting. Proposed Amendments to the Forest Practices Act: Hearing on Sub. H.B.
637 Before the House Subcomm. on Forest Practices, 43d Legis., at Seattle (July 23,
1973) (on file with the Washington Law Review). The purpose and policy section had
been altered to include "recreation, wilderness, and scenic beauty." However, the
section on regulatory power referred only to the second paragraph of the purpose
and policy section. Wash. Sub. H.B. 637, § 3(1), 43d Legis. (1973) (third draft).
A fifth draft "mysteriously" (there had been no vote at the last subcommittee
meeting) dropped the reference to "recreation and scenic beauty" in the purpose and
policy statement. Syrdal & Keegan, supra note 15, at Part I n.48. The new draft then
changed the wording of the paragraph granting the power to establish regulations
effectuating "the purposes and policies." Wash. Sub. H.B. 637, § 1(2), 43d Legis.
(Aug. 23, 1973) (sixth draft).
There is no record of a vote on this wording at the Aug. 15, 1973, meeting. Proposed
Amendments to Forest Practices Act: Hearing on Sub. H.B. 637 Before the House
Comm. on Natural Resources, 43d Legis., at Seattle (Aug. 15, 1973). No mention is
made of such a change in the bill digest accompanying the August 23 draft. With no
record of a change, it must be concluded it was the result of staff revisions. Telephone
interview with Gary Worthington, staff person for the House Natural Resources
Committee (April 15, 1977). Nevertheless, the changed section was adopted by the
legislature. At the August 27 executive session, Chairman Martinis succeeded in hav-
ing the reference to recreation and scenic beauty restored to the first paragraph of § 1.
Amendments to Sub. H.B. 637, 43d Legis., Ex. Sess. (Aug. 27, 1973). Syrdal and
Keegan state that this vote passed as a compromise for the rejection of the motion at
the August 15 meeting to include those values in the definition of public resources,
which are protected in paragraph 2 (now R.C.W. § 76.09.010(2)(b)). Syrdal & Kee-
gan, supra note 15, Part I, at 14. The result of this compromise was R.C.W. §
76.09.0 10 and .040 as they presently appear.
R.C.W. § 76.09.010(l) states that it is important to afford protection to recreation
and scenic beauty. The 1975 battle to keep this wording in the Act, see note 53 supra,
demonstrates that this was not intended as an empty gesture.
64. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 43.21C (1976 & Supp. 1977). See generally Roe & Lean,
The State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 and Its 1973 Amendments, 49 WASH. L.
REV. 509 (1974); Comment, The 1974 Amendments to Washington's State Environ-
mental Policy Act, 10 GONz. L. REV. 787 (1975).
65. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.020(2), .030 (1976). See also note 69 infra.
458
Vol. 53: 443, 1978
Forest Practices Regulation
mental values,66 including recreation and aesthetics, when approving
applications, even though the forest practices regulations do not re-
quire the Department to do so. 67 It is currently unclear whether SEPA
requires mitigation of environmental impacts, rather than merely
procedural consideration of environmental consequences. 68
SEPA also requires state agencies and local governments to deter-
mine whether activities and proposals are "major actions significantly
affecting the environment" and, if they so find, to prepare an environ-
mental impact statement (EIS).69 The inquiry thus becomes whether
the DNR must prepare an EIS when approving forest practices appli-
cations having a significant impact on the environment. Federal
66. The DNR and the FPB are state agencies to which SEPA applies, absent
some exception. See WASH. REv. CODE §§ 43.21C.020(2), .030 (1976).
67. Regardless of whether an EIS is required under the Forest Practices Act and
SEPA in combination, SEPA may require reversal of DNR action which is arbitrary
and capricious in light of environmental and other information. Cf. Eastlake Com-
munity Council v. Roanoke Assocs., 82 Wn. 2d 475, 497 n.6, 513 P.2d 36, 49 n.6
(1973). See Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 87
Wn. 2d 267, 272-73, 552 P.2d 674, 677 (1976); State v. Brannon, 84 Wn. 2d 64, 75,
530 P.2d 322, 329 (1975). Accord, Sisley v. San Juan County, 89 Wn. 2d 78, 89, 569
P.2d 712, 718-19 (1977). However, none of these cases discusses whether an agency
must consider environmental values when some of the agency's actions have been
exempted from SEPA's requirement of a detailed statement, WASH, REV. CODE §
76.09.050(1) (1976), or granted a categorical exemption from SEPA evaluations,
WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-10-170(19), 332-40-170(19) (1976).
68. See cases cited at note 67 supra. See generally Leed, The National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969; Is the Fact of Compliance a Procedural or Substantive
Question?, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 303 (1976); Robie, Recognition of Substantive
Rights under NEPA, 7 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 387 (1974); Wharton, Judicially Enforce-
able Substantive Rights under NEPA, 10 U.S.F.L. REv. 415 (1976).
69. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(c) (1976). The purpose of the EIS is to
detail the environmental impact of the proposed action, unavoidable adverse environ-
mental effects, alternatives, and long and short term relationships, as well as any ir-
reversible resource commitments involved. Id. The Act requires the responsible official
to consult other agencies prior to making a detailed statement and to make the find-
ings available to the public. Id. § 43.2 IC.030(2)(d).
Rules promulgated by the Council on Environmental Policy, under SEPA, spell out
what constitutes a "major action significantly affecting the environment," and when
an EIS is required. Id. § 43.21C. 110; WASH. ADMIN. CODE ch. 197-10 (1976).
State and local governments are required to adopt rules for implementing SEPA
consistent with the SEPA guidelines. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.120 (1976); WASH.
ADMIN. CODE ch. 197-10 (1976). Rules for the DNR are contained in W.A.C. ch.
332-40.
W.A.C. § 197-10-360 requires the responsible agency under SEPA to use an en-
vironmental checklist form in making the threshold determination of whether a major
action significantly affects the environment. This environmental checklist includes
both an aesthetics and a recreation criterion. Id. § 197-10-365.
An affirmative answer to any of the questions on the checklist will not necessarily
result in a finding that an environmental impact statement is required. "[H] owever,
a single affirmative answer could indicate a significant adverse impact, depending
upon the nature of the impact and location of the proposal." Id. § 197-10-360(2).
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courts construing the analogous National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 (NEPA)70 have held that U.S. Forest Service sales of timber
to be removed by clearcutting can be major actions significantly af-
fecting the environment, requiring preparation of environmental im-
pact statements by the Forest Service or the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment.71 A California court of appeal has held that the environmental
impact report requirement of the California Environmental Quality
Act7 2 applies to the state agency reviewing timber harvesting plans
submitted under that state's Forest Practices Act.7 3
The Washington Forest Practices Act exempts Class I, Class II,
and Class III forest practices from the requirement of a detailed
EIS.74 Arguably, as a result of this exemption, the FPB is not required
by the Forest Practices Act or SEPA to classify forest practices so that
those having a significant impact are required to be analyzed under
SEPA. The Forest Practices Act exemption from SEPA for Class I,
Class II, and Class III forest practices may therefore constitute an im-
plied amendment of SEPA.75
The implied amendment argument is questionable, however, since
the Forest Practices Act does not specifically exempt the FPB from
compliance with SEPA.7 6 The Forest Practices Act and SEPA can be
70. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4361 (1977). Because the provisions of SEPA are taken
largely verbatim from NEPA, Washington courts "look when necessary to the federal
cases construing and applying provisions of NEPA for guidance." Eastlake Community
Council v. Roanoke Assocs., 82 Wn. 2d 475, 488 n.5, 513 P.2d 36, 45 n.5 (1973).
71. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir.
1974); Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir.
1973); Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 433 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D.
Tex. 1977). See also Leschi Improvement Council v. State Highway Comm'n, 84
Wn. 2d 271, 275, 279-80, 525 P.2d 774, 775, 781-82 (1974); Juanita Bay Valley
Community Ass'n v. City of Kirkland, 9 Wn. App. 59, 68-69, 510 P.2d 1140, 1146-
47 (1973); Roe & Lean, The State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 and Its 1973
Amendments, 49 WASH. L. REV. 509, 512 (1974).
72. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21165 (West 1977).
73. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 59 Cal. App. 3d
959, 131 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1976). The California Forest Practices Act is codified at
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 4511-4621 (West 1977).
74. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.050(1) (1976). The statutory classification of
forest practices is set forth at notes 25-30 and accompanying text supra.
75. If the exemption of these forest practices is an implied amendment or partial
repeal of SEPA, this exemption may conflict with Article II, §§ 19 & 37, of the
Washington State Constitution. See, e.g., Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle v.
O'Brien, 86 Wn. 2d 339, 544 P.2d 729 (1976); Gruen v. State Tax Comm'n, 35 Wn.
2d 1, 211 P.2d 251 (1949); State v. Yelle, 32 Wn. 2d 13, 200 P.2d 467 (1948).
Amendment or repeal of SEPA is not set forth in the title of the original forest prac-
tices bill, and the section amended or repealed is not set forth at length in that bill.
Wash. Sub. H.B. 1078, 44th Legis. (1975).
76. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.21C.020(2), .030 (1976) (SEPA applies to all
"state agencies").
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construed harmoniously. SEPA specifically states that policies, regu-
lations, and laws of the state shall be interpreted and administered to
the fullest extent possible in accordance with its policies.77 The Forest
Practices Act requires that forest practices (other than Class I or Class
II) be included in Class IV and subject to SEPA evaluation if there is
"a potential for a substantial impact on the environment" which
would "therefore require an evaluation by the Department as to
whether or not a detailed statement must be prepared pursuant to
[SEPA] .,78 The Forest Practices Act provisions can thus be inter-
preted as a directive to the FPB to comply with SEPA by including
Class IV in those forest practices determined to be "major actions sig-
nificantly affecting the quality of the environment," and requiring
preparation of an EIS under SEPA.79
The FPB has not accepted this interpetation; rather, it has con-
cluded that it has authority under the Forest Practices Act to "ex-
empt" from SEPA certain activities presumptively subject to SEPA re-
quirements. The SEPA guidelines8 0 follow the FPB's interpretation by
exempting all forest practices approvals "except those forest practices
designated by the forest practices board as being subject to SEPA
evaluation." 8' Forest practices regulations divide Class IV into "Class
77. Id. § 43.21C.030 (1976). See English Bay Enterprises, Ltd. v. Island County,
89 Wn. 2d 16, 20, 568 P.2d 783, 785-86 (1977) (liberally construing the Shoreline
Management Act, R.C.W. ch. 90.58, as "mandated by the State Environmental Policy
Act").
78. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.050(1) (1976). Class I and Class II include forest
practices having "no direct potential" or "a less than ordinary potential" for damaging
a public resource. Id. Exclusion of such forest practices from SEPA analysis is logical
because, by definition, they should not include major actions significantly affecting
the environment.
79. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(c) (1976). This interpretation might also
reconcile the difference in wording regarding the standard for an EIS under the For-
est Practices Act and SEPA. Compare id. § 76.09.050(1) ("a potential for a substan-
tial impact on the environment and therefore require an evaluation") with id. §
43.21C.030(2)(c) ("major actions significantly affecting the quality of the environ-
ment"). This difference may have been inadvertent, but the Forest Practices Act spe-
cifically refers to SEPA, and the legislature doubtless knew the language of that law.
It could be inferred, therefore, that any change in language was intended. The effect,
however, is unclear, but the Forest Practices Act language does not appear to require
a higher probability or degree of impact on the environment for SEPA procedures to
apply.
80. WASH. ADMIN. CODE ch. 197-10 (1976). In 1974, the legislature created the
Council on Environmental Policy, to provide guidelines to all branches of state and
local government for interpretation and implementation of SEPA. WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 43.21C.100, .110 (1976). The Council's guidelines to other state bodies are com-
monly referred to as the SEPA guidelines. The Council's powers and duties are now
exercised by the Department of Ecology. Id. § 43.21C.100. See generally note 69
supra.
81. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-170(19)(a) (1976). The wording of the DNR
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IV-General" and "Class IV-Special," subjecting only the latter to
SEPA evaluation.82 The regulations exclude from "Class IV-Special"
numerous activities which may "have a potential for a substantial im-
pact on the environment," 83 and which could be "major actions sig-
nificantly affecting the quality of the environment."84 For example,
under current regulations the DNR may approve an application to dig
a borrow pit in excess of one acre in size, 85 construct a midslope log-
ging road above a major salmon spawning area,86 clearcut an entire
mountainside, 87 destroy an eagle's nest 88 or a beaver pond,89 or bull-
doze a streambed90 without considering environmental consequences
or alternatives under SEPA. 91 The DNR may also approve a clearcut
SEPA guidelines is identical. Id. § 332-40-170(19) (1976). Even though the
SEPA guidelines may incorporate the FPB exemptions from SEPA, neither agency
has the power to amend SEPA. The SEPA guidelines were to be promulgated for the
full implementation of SEPA, not the amendment of it. Act of May 5, 1974, ch. 179.
§ 1, 1974 Wash. Laws 633. See also Wildlife Alive v. Chickering, 18 Cal. 3d 190,
205-06, 553 P.2d 537, 545, 132 Cal. Rptr. 377, 385 (1976).
82. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-16-050(1), (2) (1976). The DNR SEPA guide-
lines are somewhat inconsistent. W.A.C. § 332-40-030(1) states that " [t] he depart-
ment policy is to fully consider the potential environmental significance of proposed
actions during the decision making process." However, W.A.C. § 332-40-315 requires
a threshold determination and completion of an environmental checklist only for
Class IV-Special nonexempt forest practices. See note 106 infra. Apparently the De-
partment does not believe it is required by SEPA to consider environmental factors
if the application it is considering is exempted from preparation of an EIS.
Although the regulations exempt the DNR from SEPA compliance in all cases
except Class IV-Special and where a license other than a forest practices application
is involved, the DNR has discretionary power to require an environmental assessment.
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 332-40-050 (1976).
83. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.050(1) (1976); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-16-
050(2)-(5) (1976).
84. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(c) (1976).
85. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-16-050(5)(g) (1976).
86. Id. § 222-16-050(5)(f) (Class III).
87. Id. § 222-16-050(5)(e) (Class III).
88. Id. § 222-16-050(2)(c) (Class IV-General). See id. §§ 222-12-090, -16-
0 10(23). But see State of Washington Forest Practices Board, Forest Practices Board
Manual 7 (July 16, 1976), reprinted in WASHINGTON FOREST PRACTICE BOARD, DEPART-
MENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, WASHINGTON FOREST PRACTICE RULES AND REGULATIONS
(July 16, 1976): "This section of the Manual, which is advisory, contains recom-
mended practices for protection of such habitats." Id. at 6.
89. The Forest Practices Board Manual, see note 88 supra, deals with beaver
ponds, but is only advisory in nature. There is no regulation on the subject. The De-
partments of Fisheries and Game may determine that a separate hydraulics permit is
necessary for such action. WASH. REV. CODE § 75.20.100 (1976). However, the De-
partments have contracted away part of this authority, and the SEPA guidelines
exempt many hydraulics permits from evaluation under SEPA. See note 103 infra.
90. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-16-050(4)(e), ()(1976).
91. Without an environmental evaluation required by the DNR, an operator may
also be allowed to mechanically scarify the area with heavy equipment, id. § 222-16-
050(3) (Class I); plant seedlings, id. § 222-16-050(3)6) (Class I); spray the area
with pesticides, even if the bald eagle's nest referred to in the text were still active,
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on private land within the boundaries of a national wilderness area,
without requiring an EIS.92 The Department may approve all such
applications without an EIS under the regulations.93 Furthermore,
there is no required evaluation of the long-term effects of removing
forest land from production. 94
Current forest practices regulations and SEPA guidelines afford lit-
tle protection for recreation and scenic beauty. Yet SEPA requires
that many forest operations not now subject to environmental review
be evaluated by the DNR to determine whether their approval consti-
tutes a major action significantly affecting the environment. 95 In
addition, the Forest Practices Act does not authorize creation of a
"Class IV-General," thereby exempting actions with a potential for
substantial impact on the environment from SEPA compliance. 96
Therefore, in order to comply with the Forest Practices Act and
SEPA, forest practices regulations and SEPA guidelines must be re-
vised.
and dump large amounts of fertilizer and other chemicals on the area, id. §§ 222-16-
050(2)(c), -38-010 to 020. See id. § 222-16-050(1)(a) (EIS may be required on
lands known to contain designated endangered wildlife). The only species listed as
threatened or endangered in this regard are the Columbia white-tail deer, the pere-
grine falcon, and the grizzly bear.
92. Cf. id. § 222-16-050(l)(c) (Class IV-Special only covers landlocked parcels
within national, state, and local parks).
93. Id. § 222-16-050 (except Class IV-Special). Roughly 25,000 to 30,000 ap-
plications and notifications have been processed under the Forest Practices Act. Less
than 10% of these were Class IV applications; even fewer were Class IV-Special
applications. An EIS has been required in three instances. On two occasions an EIS
was required for tussock moth spraying operations. The Department also determined
that an EIS was required for a proposal to log on mining claims inside the boundaries
of the North Cascades National Park. This EIS was never prepared because logging
was never begun due to the lack of a right of way through the Park. Telephone inter-
view with Glenn Hawley, Supervisor, Division of Private Forestry, Department of
Natural Resources (Dec. 29, 1977). See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
94. The Board's creation of "Class IV-General" removed applications involving
the items listed at R.C.W. § 76.09.050(l)(a), (b), and (c) from SEPA evaluation.
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-16-050(2) (1976). This means the Department need not
evaluate whether taking forest land out of production is in the long range best interest
of the state. But see discussion of departmental discretion at note 82 supra. This
seems clearly contrary to one purpose of the Act, promotion of timber growth. See
WASH. REv. CODE §§ 76.09.010, .070 (1976).
It is worth noting that R.C.W. § 76.09.050(1) is phrased in the conjunctive as
well as the disjunctive. Therefore it can be argued that the legislature intended the
FPB to establish means to classify proposals for forest practices on lands platted after
January 1, 1960, converted to another use, or liable to be converted to urban develop-
ment, to determine if preparation of an EIS was required.
95. See National Resources Defense Council v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 59 Cal. App.
3d 959, 131 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1976) (California statutes); WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21C.
030(a), (c) (1976); text accompanying notes 72 & 73 supra.
96. But see note 94 supra.
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C. Authority of the Departments of Ecology, Fisheries, and Game
Regarding Forest Practices
The limited authority of the Department of Ecology over forest
practices relates to protection of water quality. 97 The Departments of
Fisheries and Game have authority over some forest practices affect-
ing the commercial and sports fisheries under the Hydraulics Act.98
The Forest Practices Act requires the DNR to forward copies of
forest practice applications and notifications to the Departments of
Ecology, Fisheries, and Game, as well as to the county in which the
activity is to occur.99 These agencies may then address comments to
the DNR. 100 This process fosters agency agreement on what is to be
required of the applicant and avoids a multipermit process. If the
agencies fail to agree on restrictions for the forest practice, however,
this process will not prevent the Departments of Fisheries and Game
from requiring a separate hydraulics permit. An interagency agree-
ment between the Departments of Ecology, Fisheries, Game, and Nat-
ural Resources streamlines the review and comment process, reducing
the likelihood of a separate permit requirement or other involvement
by the individual departments. 101
If a forest practice requires the departments of Fisheries and Game
to issue a separate hydraulics permit, SEPA is potentially applica-
ble.10 2 Current SEPA guidelines, however, exempt hydraulics permits
from compliance with SEPA. 103
1
97. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 76.09.040, .100, .160, .260 (1976); id. §§ 90.48.420,
.425 (1976). For a discussion of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, see Mis-
kovsky & Van Hook, Regulation of Forestry Related Nonpoint Source Pollution Un-
der the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 9 NAT. RESOURCES
LAW. 645 (1976).
98. The Hydraulics Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 75.20.100 (1976), requires submis-
sion to the directors of the Departments of Fisheries and Game of full plans and spe-
cifications for any project "that will use, divert, obstruct, or change the natural flow
or bed of any river or stream or that will utilize any of the waters of the state or
materials from the stream beds." Written approval from the Departments of Fisheries
and Game is required before the operations may commence, except in certain emer-
gencies.
99. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.050(5) (1976).
100. Id.
101. Interagency Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Forest Practices,
(prepared Feb. 23, 1976, and finally approved by all Department heads (Ecology,
Fisheries, Game, and Natural Resources) May 17, 1976) (on file with Washington
Law Review).
102. See, e.g., Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., 82 Wn. 2d 475,
513 P.2d 36 (1973).
103. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-175(5)(b) (1976) (all hydraulic project ap-
provals incidental to forest practices are exempt from SEPA evaluation, except those
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D. General Local Government Authority over Forest Practices
Local and regional governments also have powers which could be
used to protect recreation, scenic beauty, and other environmental
values,' 04 but the Forest Practices Act prevents effective use of such
authority. 105 For example, local and regional entities may exercise
land use planning and enact zoning restrictions over lands platted af-
ter January 1, 1960, or lands to be converted to a use other than com-
mercial timber production, 106 but they may not restrict forest prac-
tices allowed under the forest practices regulations. The Forest
Practices Act prohibits any local permit system solely relating to for-
est practices, and requires that "additional or more stringent regula-
tions" be consistent with the forest practices regulations. 107 In addi-
tion, local regulations may not "unreasonably prevent timber
harvesting."'1 8 Nevertheless, if a local government requires issuance
of a permit under its zoning powers or its powers under the Shoreline
Management Act, SEPA may apply;i 09 the issuing body would then
be required to consider the impact of the forest operation on recrea-
tion and scenic beauty.
designated by the FPB as being subject to SEPA scrutiny). See also id. §§ 197-10-
230(4), -10-200.
104. See note 11 supra. Such powers could be used to declare forest lands off
limits to development in order to preserve a greenbelt around an urban area. This
authority could also be used to prevent timber harvesting in or near areas of recrea-
tional or aesthetic value.
105. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.240 (1976).
106. Id. § 76.09.240(1). Local governments may also exercise their taxing powers
and regulatory authority with respect to public health. Id. § 76.09.240(2)-(3). There
is a complex set of provisions in the Forest Practices Act to ensure lands are reforested
and to preserve the narrow powers left to local and regional governments. Id. §
76.09.060(3)(b).
107. Id. § 76.09.240(1). The FPB's modification or elimination of the reforesta-
tion requirement on lands likely to be converted to urban development within ten
years must be consistent with local and regional land use plans or ordinances. Id. §
76.09.070; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-34-050 (1976).
108. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.240(1) (1976).
109. See, e.g., Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., 82 Wn. 2d 475,
513 P.2d 36 (1973). A county or city requiring a nonexempt license under its powers
enumerated in R.C.W. § 76.09.240 is the "lead agency." WAsH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-
10-230(4) (1976). But see id. § 197-10-230(5) (forest practices on state lands);
id. § 197-10-230(6) (application of Environmental Coordination Procedures Act
of 1973, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.62 (1976)). See also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 332-40-
230(4).
As lead agency, the county or city is the only agency of government responsible for
complying with the threshold determination procedures of W.A.C. §§ 197-10-300 to
-390, and the only agency responsible for preparation, circulation, and revision of any
EIS required by SEPA. Id. § 197-10-200 (1976).
Nevertheless, the categorical exemption for all forest practices except those specifical-
ly made subject to SEPA by the Forest Practices Board still applies to local govern-
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The Forest Practices Act also addresses the powers of county gov-
ernments to regulate forest practices. Counties may participate in the
review and comment process, and may file objections with both the
DNR and the applicant, alleging that departmental approval would
be inconsistent with the Act, regulations, or local authority. 110 A
timely objection relating to lands platted after January 1, 1960, or
land being converted to another use will forestall approval."' Follow-
ing receipt of such an objection, the DNR must either disapprove the
challenged portions of the application or appeal the county objections
to the Forest Practices Appeals Board. 1 2 Conversely, a county may
appeal any DNR approval of an application involving lands within
the county's jurisdiction. 113 Counties may also sue the Department,
the forest landowner, timber owner, or operator to enforce the forest
practices regulations or final orders of the Department or the Appeals
Board." 4 Unfortunately, these special county powers do little more
than ensure enforcement of the Forest Practices Act and regulations.
They do not allow counties to promulgate forest practices regulations
which would protect recreation or aesthetics, or which might be in-
consistent with the Forest Practices Act or its forest practices regula-
tions."15
mental agencies. Id. §§ 197-10-170(19), 332-40-170(19)(a), 332-40-177(2). In
any case, DNR regulations implementing SEPA and the SEPA guidelines also require
the Department to complete an environmental checklist for actions requiring a non-
exempt license. Id. § 332-40-315(1)(b), (g).
110. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.050(5)-(6) (1976). The Department must re-
ceive the county's written objections within 14 business days from the time of trans-
mittal of a copy of the application to the county, or one day before the Department
acts on the application, whichever is later. Id. § 76.09.050(7)(a).
111. Id. § 76.09.050(7)(b)(i), (ii).
112. Id. § 76.09.050(7).
113. Id. § 76.09.050(8).
114. Id. § 76.09.140. However, no civil or criminal penalties may be imposed for
past actions or omissions conducted pursuant to an approval or directive of the DNR.
Id. The same subsection also provides that such actions may not be commenced unless
the DNR fails to take appropriate action within 10 days after written notice has been
received from the county of a violation of the forest practices regulations or final
orders of the Department or the Appeals Board.
A county may waive its rights to receive notice of applications and notifications
from the DNR, to object to forest practices, and to appeal DNR actions to the Appeals
Board. Id. § 76.09.050(11). A number of counties have done so. This subsection
provides, however, that such waiver may be withdrawn or modified at any time by
written notice to the Department.
115. Id. § 76.09.240.
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E. Effect of the Forest Practices Act on the Shoreline Management
Act
The Shoreline Management Act' 16 enunciates a policy of protect-
ing aesthetics and other environmental values in shoreline areas of the
state. 1 7 Local governments have the primary responsibility for
initiating and administering the regulatory program of the Act
through local master programs." 8 The master programs control activ-
ities along "shorelines of the state"" 9 within local jurisdictions. 20
The Act sets out numerous elements to be included in these plans,
among them a "recreational element for the preservation and enlarge-
ment of recreational opportunities" and a "conservation element for
the preservation of natural resources, including but not limited to sce-
nic vistas [and] aesthetics."' 21
116. The Shoreline Management Act, WASH. REv. CODE ch. 90.58 (1976 & Supp.
1977), was the product of both an initiative drive by environmentalists and legislative
action, the legislative version being chosen by the voters in 1972. Crooks, The Wash-
ington Shoreline Management Act of1971, 49 WASH. L. REv. 423 (1974).
117. WASH. REv. CODE § 90.58.020 (1976). "Shorelines of the state" are defined
in R.C.W. § 90.58.030(2)(c) as the total of all "shorelines" and "shorelines of state-
wide significance." Shorelines are defined as:
[A] II of the water areas of the state, including reservoirs, and their associated
wetlands, together with the lands underlying them; except (i) shorelines of
state-wide significance; (ii) shorelines on segments of streams upstream of a point
where the mean annual flow is twenty cubic feet per second or less and the wet-
lands associated with such upstream segments; and (iii) shorelines on lakes less
than twenty acres in size and wetlands associated with such small lakes.
Id. § 90.58.030(2)(d).
"Shorelines of state-wide significance," excluded from the definition of shorelines
above, are defined in R.C.W. § 90.58.030(2)(e) to include the state's ocean shore-
lines; areas along the Strait of Juan de Fuca, Hood Canal, and Puget Sound; and cer-
tain large lakes and rivers.
118. Id. § 90.58.050. The Department of Ecology acts primarily in a supportive
and review capacity with primary emphasis on insuring compliance with the policy
and provisions of the Shoreline Management Act. Developments on "shorelines of
the state" must be consistent with the policy of the Act and with the applicable guide-
lines, regulations, or master program adopted or approved. Id. § 90.58.140(1). "Sub-
stantial" developments, defined in R.C.W. § 90.58.030(3)(e), require permits from
the local government, assuming it has had its master plan approved by the Depart-
ment of Ecology. Id. §§ 90.58.090, .140(2). After departmental adoption or approval
of a master program, a permit may not be granted unless it is consistent with the ap-
plicable master program and the policy of R.C.W. § 90.58.020. Id. § 90.58.140(2)(b).
119. Id. § 90.58.030(2)(c); see note 117 supra.
120. WASH. REv. CODE § 90.58.080 (1976). When these master programs are
adopted or approved by the Department of Ecology, they constitute use regulations
for the various shorelines of the state. Id. § 90.58.100(1).
121. Id. § 90.58.100(2)(c), (). In addition, R.C.W. § 90.58.100(4) provides:
"Master programs will reflect that state-owned shorelines of the state are particularly
adapted to providing wilderness beaches, ecological study areas, and other recreational
activities for the public and will give appropriate special consideration to same."
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The Forest Practices Act limits local authority under the Shoreline
Management Act regarding "shorelines," but does not limit local au-
thority over "shorelines of state-wide significance."' 22 In "shoreline"
areas, regulations adopted under the Forest Practices Act are the ex-
clusive rules for forest practices. 123 Nevertheless, counties are allowed
to enforce these forest practices regulations, 124 and local governments
can require a shoreline management permit for some roadbuilding in
shoreline areas. 125
The Forest Practices Act expressly limits local government
authority under the Shoreline Management Act to lands located ex-
clusively within "shorelines of the state."' 26 This provision alters the
general rule contained in Merkel v. Port of Brownsville,127 which ap-
plied the Shoreline Management Act to forest operations partly within
and partly without "shorelines of the state."'128
The Forest Practices Act does not limit either local government or
Department of Ecology authority over "shorelines of state-wide signif-
icance,"'129 but only a small portion of commercial forest land is
located within these specific shoreline areas. Thus, the net effect of
the Forest Practices Act has been to significantly reduce the shoreline
management authority of local governments.
III. CONCLUSION
The Forest Practices Act states that "it is important to afford pro-
122. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.240(4) (1976). The Forest Practices Act allows
local governments to continue to prohibit, restrict, or prescribe rules of conduct for
forest practices within "shorelines of state-wide significance." R.C.W. § 76.09.240(4)(a)
and (b) affect only "shorelines," and R.C.W. § 76.09.240(4)(c) provides that the
section shall not "create, add to, or diminish the authority of local government . . .
except as provided in (a) and (b) above." The definition of "shorelines" in the Shore-
line Management Act excludes "shorelines of state-wide significance." WASH. REV.
CODE § 90.58.030(a), (d) (1976). See note 117 supra.
123. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.240(4)(a) (1976). Enforcement may be had
solely as provided in the Forest Practices Act. Id. The legislature must have intended
to prevent local regulations under the Shoreline Management Act in "shoreline"
areas, and not to have implicitly abolished the provisions of R.C.W. § 90.58.150.
which regulates even-age management systems in shoreline areas.
124. Id. § 76.09.140(2).
125. Id. § 76.09.240(4)(b). See note 13 supra.
126. Id. § 76.09.240(4)(c).
127. 8 Wn. App. 844, 509 P.2d 390 (1973) (apparently overruled only as to forest
practices).
128. Id. at 851, 509 P.2d at 395.
129. See note 117 supra.
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tection to . . . recreation [and] scenic beauty."'13 0 Despite this lan-
guage, the Act has been construed to limit promulgation of forest
practices regulations protecting recreation or aesthetics. Forest prac-
tices regulations and SEPA guidelines prevent effective protection of
these values under SEPA. When combined, the Forest Practices Act,
its regulations, and the SEPA guidelines prevent effective protection
of recreation and scenic beauty by local governments and state agen-
cies other than the DNR.
State agencies could provide more protection for recreation and
scenic beauty than currently exists. The FPB could promulgate regu-
lations to protect recreation and aesthetics. The Department of Ecol-
ogy could revise the SEPA guidelines to require more consideration of
the impact of forest practices on recreation and scenic beauty. How-
ever, comprehensive protection for these values will require new
legislation. A state Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Plan-
ning Act, regulating public and private lands and modeled after the
federal law, could provide a partial solution.' 3 ' Restriction of clear-
cutting, based upon the land use assessments provided under such an
act, would be another positive step.132 Such comprehensive systems
require a great deal of legislative involvement and informed citizen
participation. The process is time-consuming but necessary in order to
improve the presently inadequate system of environmental and land
130. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.010(1) (1976).
131. The Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974, as
amended by the National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614
(1976), offers one approach to ensuring future suppliers of timber and protecting en-
vironmental values. However, these acts apply only to publicly owned lands, where
political considerations differ from those surrounding regulation of nonpublic lands.
The National Forest Management Act gave the Forest Service the power to clearcut
and a more liberal interpretation of sustained yield management than conservationists
desired. On the other hand, the Act also gave conservationists statutory language and
guidelines to ensure that forest management activities are conducted in an environ-
mentally sound manner. See Comment, The National Forest Service and the Forest
and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J.
603 (1975); authorities cited at note 4 supra.
132. See note 4 supra. State Representative Earl Tilly has announced he will in-
troduce legislation in the next session of the state legislature to prohibit clearcutting
in scenic areas within the view of state highways. A GMA Research Corporation poll
commissioned by the Seattle Times found that two out of every three persons inter-
viewed in western Washington favored such legislation. The Seattle Times, Oct. 9, 1977,
§ E, at I., col. I.
The National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1976),
provides some restrictions on clearcutting in the National Forest system. Clearcutting
is permitted only where it is the optimum method and other even-age management
cuts are allowed only when they are deemed to be an appropriate method to meet
the objectives of the land management plan. See id. § 1604(g)(3)(F).
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use controls. If old growth forests on nonfederal lands are to be pre-
served for recreational and aesthetic purposes, such protective mea-
sures must come soon.
Brian L. Hansen*
*Member, Washington State Bar Association; A.B., 1974, Stanford University; J.D.,
1977, University of Washington.
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